Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
垄断、效率与非法移民的规范化
Monopsony, Efficiency, and the Regularization of Undocumented Immigrants
摘要
In 1981, President Mitterrand regularized the status of undocumented immigrants in France, who comprised 12 percent of the non-French workforce and about 1 percent of all workers. Employers have monopsony power over undocumented workers because the undocumented find it costly to participate in the open market. By alleviating this labor market imperfection, a regularization program can move the market closer to the efficient competitive equilibrium and increase employment and wages for the authorized workforce. Our empirical analysis reveals that the Mitterrand regularization program raised employment and wages for low-skill native and immigrant men and increased per-capita GDP.
中文摘要
1981年，法国总统密特朗对无证移民的身份进行了合法化，这些移民占非法国籍劳动力的12%，约占全体工人的1%。由于无证移民参与公开市场的成本高昂，雇主对他们拥有买方垄断权力。通过缓解这一劳动力市场的不完善，合法化计划能使市场更接近有效竞争均衡，并提高合法劳动力的就业率和工资。我们的实证分析表明，密特朗合法化计划提升了低技能本土及移民男性的就业与工资水平，并增加了人均GDP。