Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
具有网络外部性的多代理契约
Multi‐Agent Contracting With Network Externalities
摘要
This paper analyzes how the structure of externalities‐encompassing both pure spillovers and interactive components‐reshapes the classic trade‐off between incentives and risk in multi‐agent contracts. The interplay of network effects and moral hazard generates congestion effects among agents with a common neighbor, which we decompose into a sum of weighted Katz‐Bonacich centralities. This tractable characterization enables clear comparative statics on the externality structure. We further apply the framework to examine how organization structures shape firm boundaries, and the design of Pigovian taxes to generate social security.
中文摘要
本文分析了外部性结构——既包括纯溢出效应，也包括交互成分——如何重塑多代理合同中激励与风险之间的经典权衡。网络效应与道德风险的相互作用在具有共同邻居的代理之间产生拥堵效应，我们将其分解为加权Katz-Bonacich中心性之和。这一易于处理的刻画使得对外部性结构进行清晰的比较静态分析成为可能。我们进一步应用该框架考察组织结构如何塑造企业边界，以及旨在产生社会保障的庇古税设计。