Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
纳什与ε-纳什实施
Nash and Epsilon-Nash implementation
摘要
In this paper, we investigate the implementation problem that arises when the designer is uncertain about the agents’ rationality. We discuss double implementation in Nash and -Nash equilibria.We fully characterize the social choice rules which can be doubly implemented in Nash and ε-Nash equilibria.
中文摘要
本文探讨了当设计者对参与者理性程度不确定时所产生的实施问题。我们讨论了纳什均衡与ε-纳什均衡下的双重实施。我们完整刻画了能够在纳什均衡与ε-纳什均衡下被双重实施的社会选择规则。