Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
国家工资合同、买方垄断与南北经济中的福利
National Wage Contracts, Monopsony, and Welfare in a North-South Economy*,†
摘要
In countries characterized by significant geographical disparities in productivity, nationwide labour contracts may cause local unemployment by preventing the adjustments that would occur in a competitive labour market. Here we argue, however, that when there are mobility frictions and monopsony power, nationwide contracts may still be preferable to local contracts. Using a spatial general equilibrium model calibrated on the Italian North-South divide, we suggest that nationwide wage contracts may still lead to narrower regional welfare gaps if monopsony power is sufficiently strong in low-productivity areas.
中文摘要
在生产率存在显著地理差异的国家，全国性劳动合同可能通过阻止竞争性劳动力市场中本会发生的调整而导致地方失业。然而，我们认为，当存在流动性摩擦和买方垄断力量时，全国性合同可能仍优于地方性合同。使用一个以意大利南北差距为校准基准的空间一般均衡模型，我们表明，如果低生产率地区的买方垄断力量足够强，全国性工资合同仍可能带来更小的区域福利差距。