Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
消除隐性绿色保护主义：国内税国民待遇的效率
Neutralizing Hidden Green Protectionism: The Efficiency of National Treatment with Internal Taxes
摘要
Does the National Treatment (NT) principle inevitably induce "hidden green protectionism"? While existing literature suggests that NT leads to inefficiently stringent product standards, we show that this distortion vanishes when governments can jointly deploy standards and internal taxes. Using an international oligopoly model, we find that the threshold for switching to cleaner standards under NT coincides with that under international cooperation. The availability of internal fiscal instruments allows governments to decouple environmental objectives from strategic trade motives, thereby restoring the regulatory efficiency of standard-setting under NT.
中文摘要
国民待遇（NT）原则是否必然引发“隐性绿色保护主义”？既有文献认为，NT会导致效率上过严的产品标准，但我们表明，当政府能够联合运用标准与内部税收时，这种扭曲便会消失。通过一个国际寡头模型，我们发现，在NT下转向更清洁标准的门槛与国际合作下的门槛一致。内部财政工具的可用性使政府能够将环境目标与战略性贸易动机脱钩，从而恢复NT下标准制定的监管效率。