Econ Papers Daily / 研究评论
切勿浪费一场好危机：任期限制与银行业改革
Never let a good crisis go to waste: Term limits and banking reforms
摘要
Financial crises routinely trigger sweeping overhauls of financial regulation, but whose interests do these reforms serve? Using data on financial policies in 88 democracies between 1973 and 2015, this column shows that leaders facing a binding term limit roll back financial liberalisation roughly three times more than leaders who can run again – but only in the wake of a financial crisis. The reforms they enact tend to favour incumbent banks over the general public. The effect is concentrated in countries where revolving doors between politics and finance are common, brings post-government career benefits to policymakers, but leads to no gains in banking stability.
中文摘要
金融危机 routinely 引发金融监管的全面改革，但这些改革服务于谁的利益？本文利用1973年至2015年间88个民主国家的金融政策数据表明，面临刚性任期限制的领导人逆转金融自由化的程度大约是能够竞选连任的领导人的三倍——但仅在金融危机之后。他们实施的改革往往偏向现有银行而非普通公众。这一效应集中在政治与金融之间“旋转门”现象普遍的国家，为政策制定者带来卸任后的职业收益，却未能在银行稳定性方面带来任何改善。