Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
新闻媒体作为叙事（及信息）的提供者
News media as suppliers of narratives (and information)
摘要
We present a model in which news media shape beliefs by providing information (signals about an exogenous state) and narratives (models of what determines outcomes). To amplify consumers' engagement, the media maximize their anticipatory utility. We characterize the optimal monopolistic media strategy, highlighting the synergy between false narratives and biased information. Consumer heterogeneity gives rise to a novel menu‐design problem due to an “equilibrium data externality” among consumers. The optimal menu includes false narratives, and can generate polarized beliefs and choices without any information transmission. False narratives and polarization also feature in a competitive version of our model, albeit coupled with complete information. Nevertheless, competition can make some consumers objectively worse off.
中文摘要
我们构建了一个模型，其中新闻媒体通过提供信息（关于外生状态的信号）和叙事（解释结果决定因素的模型）来塑造信念。为提升消费者参与度，媒体最大化其预期效用。我们刻画了最优垄断媒体策略，揭示了虚假叙事与有偏信息之间的协同效应。消费者异质性引致了一个新颖的菜单设计问题，其根源在于消费者间存在的"均衡数据外部性"。最优菜单包含虚假叙事，且能在无任何信息传递的情况下催生极化信念与选择。在竞争性版本模型中，尽管伴随完全信息条件，虚假叙事与极化现象依然存在。然而，竞争可能使部分消费者的客观福利恶化。