Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
雇佣枪手与意识形态者：律师事务所为何会聘请诚实的专家证人？
Of hired guns and ideologues: Why would a law firm ever retain an honest expert witness?
摘要
Suppose that expert witnesses appearing in litigation are, generically, either honest in their assessment of a fact situation or are advocates who testify in favour of their retaining party, regardless of new information. The type of a witness is known to law firms, who engage with them repeatedly, but not to courts. If the only way an honest witness can credibly reveal their type to a court is by agreeing with some of the position of the opposing party, then the question arises of why a law firm would ever retain an honest expert. We show that it can act as a signalling device in a game between the law firms to communicate private information regarding a party's confidence in winning the case. Our results indicate, inter alia, that the “English” rule of costs allocation can make a socially desirable separating equilibrium less likely, compared to the “American” rule.
中文摘要
假设在诉讼中出庭的专家证人，大体上可分为两类：一类对其所面对的事实情况评估诚实，另一类则是不论新信息如何，都倾向于为其委托方作证的辩护型证人。律师事务所因与证人反复打交道而知晓其类型，但法院对此并不知情。如果诚实证人能向法院可信地揭示其类型的唯一途径，是部分认同对方当事人的立场，那么问题便产生了：律师事务所为何会聘请诚实专家？我们证明，在律师事务所之间传递关于其案件胜诉信心的私人信息博弈中，这可以作为一种信号机制。我们的研究结果尤其表明，与“美国”规则相比，“英国”的费用分配规则可能使社会期望的分离均衡更难以实现。