Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
论联合储蓄协会的最优规模：第二部分——效率
On the optimal size of a joint savings association: Part 2 - efficiency
摘要
A joint savings group, JSG, is a form of micro-financing by which people who have limited or no access to formal financial markets can expedite the acquisition of a desired (often indivisible) good. Because typically multiple arrangements of joint saving are feasible, a rule is needed for admitting group formations that bring the expected waiting time to a minimum and rejecting group formations that do not: when people form a JSG, they will want to know the efficient group size. Somewhat surprisingly, the existing literature does not address this need. This lacuna prompted us to develop an analytical framework that yielded the following rule: for a given number of co-savers, N, and a given cost of the desired good, C, the efficient sets of JSGs are sets in each of which every group except for at most one group is of a size that is a multiple of C. Analyzing the robustness of our rule to a change in N and C, we find that the number of efficient sets of JSGs does not change monotonically with respect to N and C. In particular, an increase in N and a decrease in C may actually decrease the number of efficient sets of JSGs.
中文摘要
联合储蓄小组（JSG）是一种微型融资形式，通过它，那些对正规金融市场准入有限或无法进入的人可以加快获得所需（通常不可分割）商品的速度。由于通常存在多种可行的联合储蓄安排，因此需要一条规则来接纳能使预期等待时间最小化的群体形成，并拒绝不能做到这一点的群体形成：当人们组成JSG时，他们会想知道有效率的群体规模。颇为令人意外的是，现有文献并未涉及这一需求。这一空白促使我们开发了一个分析框架，并得出了以下规则：对于给定的共同储蓄者人数N和给定所需商品的成本C，有效率的JSG集合是这样一些集合，在每一个集合中，除至多一个群体外，每个群体的规模都是C的倍数。在分析我们的规则对N和C变化的稳健性时，我们发现，有效JSG集合的数量并不会相对于N和C单调变化。特别是，N的增加和C的减少实际上可能会减少有效JSG集合的数量。