Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
论完全披露的最优性
On the Optimality of Full Disclosure
摘要
A privately informed sender can commit to any disclosure policy toward a receiver, whose actions affect the utility of the sender. We show that full disclosure is optimal under a sufficient condition with some desirable properties. First, it speaks directly to the parties' utility functions, as opposed to the sender's indirect utility function; this makes it easily interpretable and verifiable. Second, it does not require the sender's payoff to be a function of the posterior mean state. Third, it is weaker than the conditions obtained in the literature for some specific settings.
中文摘要
拥有私人信息的发送者可以向接收者承诺任何信息披露政策，而接收者的行为会影响发送者的效用。我们证明，在具备某些理想性质的充分条件下，完全披露是最优的。首先，该条件直接针对双方的效用函数，而非发送者的间接效用函数，因此易于解释和验证。其次，它不要求发送者的收益是后验均值状态的函数。第三，它比文献中针对某些特定情境所得出的条件更为宽松。