Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
基于购买依赖偏好下行为导向价格歧视的盈利性研究
On the profitability of behaviour‐based price discrimination under purchase‐dependent preferences
摘要
We study optimal monopoly pricing of non‐durable goods over two periods when consumer preferences evolve endogenously. We introduce a propensity for a second purchase that defines the influence of the first‐period purchase on the second‐period willingness to pay for the product, reflecting either satiation or habit. With this setting, second‐period demand depends on first‐period purchase and price, raising a dynamic pricing problem. Optimal pricing is analyzed with, at the second period, either uniform pricing or price discrimination between past and new buyers. We show that the propensity for a second purchase affects the capacity of the monopoly to commit on the pricing scheme and on second‐period prices. In particular, the monopoly, if able, cannot escape from discriminating between past and new buyers at the second period. However, this pricing scheme is more profitable for the monopoly, as compared to uniform pricing, if there is strong enough satiation. Moreover, the monopoly can commit on second‐period prices only with uniform pricing and habit. These results contrast with the standard literature on dynamic pricing and behaviour‐based price discrimination.
中文摘要
我们研究当消费者偏好内生演变时，非耐用品在两期内的最优垄断定价问题。我们引入一种二次购买倾向，该倾向定义了第一期购买对第二期产品支付意愿的影响，反映饱足感或习惯效应。在此设定下，第二期需求依赖于第一期的购买行为及价格，从而引出一个动态定价问题。我们分析了在第二期采用统一定价或对老顾客与新顾客实施价格歧视时的最优定价策略。研究表明，二次购买倾向影响垄断者在定价方案及第二期价格上的承诺能力。特别是，若垄断者有能力，则无法在第二期避免对新老顾客实施价格歧视。然而，当饱足感足够强时，相较于统一定价，这种价格歧视方案对垄断者更为有利。此外，垄断者仅在统一定价且存在习惯效应的情况下，才能对第二期价格作出承诺。这些结果与动态定价及基于行为的价格歧视的标准文献形成对比。