Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
机会猎手：竞争性序贯检查模型
Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections
摘要
We introduce a new type of games, called “opportunity-hunting games,” in which two players compete to discover an uncertain event (“opportunity”) that occurs at an unobserved and random point in time. Players can inspect whether the event has already occurred again and again, but each inspection is costly. Varying the parameters of the model spans the range from games where competition between the players to be the first to identify the opportunity is the dominant force, to games in which free riding on the other player’s effort is the dominant force. We characterize the game’s unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C73)
中文摘要
我们引入了一类新型博弈，称为“机会搜寻博弈”。在该博弈中，两个参与者竞相发现一个在未观测到的随机时间点发生的不确定事件（即“机会”）。参与者可以反复检查该事件是否已经发生，但每次检查都需要付出成本。通过调整模型参数，该博弈涵盖了从“抢先识别机会的竞争”为主导力量，到“搭便车利用对方努力”为主导力量的全范围情形。我们刻画了该博弈唯一的对称马尔可夫完美均衡。（JEL分类号：C72, C73）