Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
序列说服中的最优发送者排序
Optimal sender ordering in sequential persuasion
摘要
This paper studies the impact of the order of senders in a sequential Bayesian persuasion game on the receiver’s equilibrium utility. We find that it is always optimal for the receiver to put the more aligned sender before the less aligned sender. Comparative statics analysis shows that when we restrict to senders who are comparable (i.e., a sender is more aligned than the other sender), as the degree of misalignment between senders increases or as the number of senders increases, the receiver’s equilibrium utility may (weakly) decrease. In addition, we find that when senders are comparable, the sequential game performs no worse than the simultaneous game in terms of information disclosure.
中文摘要
本文研究了序贯贝叶斯说服博弈中发送者顺序对接收者均衡效用的影响。我们发现，将更契合的发送者置于较不契合的发送者之前，对接收者而言总是最优的。比较静态分析表明，当限制在可比较的发送者之间（即一个发送者比另一个更契合）时，随着发送者间不契合程度的增加或发送者数量的增加，接收者的均衡效用可能（弱）下降。此外，我们发现当发送者可比较时，序贯博弈在信息披露方面不劣于同时博弈。