Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
分散且扭曲信念下的最优税收
Optimal Tax under Dispersed and Distorted Beliefs
摘要
We study optimal corrective taxation in a large economy where the aggregate action imposes a negative externality. Agents observe a public signal, which the planner also sees, and private signals, which neither the planner nor other agents see. Agents overreact to both by overestimating their precision. The optimal tax closes the gap between equilibrium and the social optimum, and decomposes into the tax rule that would be optimal under rational expectations and a behavioral adjustment. Conventional wisdom, derived from common-belief models, holds that the adjustment should make the tax more sensitive to the public signal. But that logic assumes agents act only on what the planner observes. Once beliefs are dispersed, the adjustment must instead work through the realized aggregate action, and its direct response to the public signal reverses sign.
中文摘要
我们研究一个大型经济体中的最优矫正税，其中总体行为施加负外部性。行为人观察到一个公共信号，规划者也能看到该信号，以及私人信号，而规划者和其他行为人均看不到这些私人信号。行为人对这两类信号都反应过度，因为他们高估了其精确度。最优税弥合了均衡与社会最优之间的差距，并可分解为在理性预期下本应最优的税收规则和一项行为调整。源自共同信念模型的传统观点认为，该调整应使税收对公共信号更为敏感。但这一逻辑假设行为人仅依据规划者所观察到的信息行动。一旦信念分散，调整就必须转而通过已实现的总体行为发挥作用，而其对公共信号的直接反应则符号反转。