Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
新的出去，旧的进来？超国家银行监管与企业投资构成
Out with the new, in with the old? Supranational bank supervision and the composition of firm investment
摘要
Using exogenous variation generated by the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the euro area, we find that relative to firms borrowing from banks subject to national supervision, firms borrowing from banks subject to supranational supervision reduce their share of intangible assets. This effect does not pre-date the supervisory reform and it does not obtain in non-SSM jurisdictions. The reallocation of investment away from intangible assets is stronger for small and young firms and appears to be driven by a short-term reduction in lending and a persistent increase in collateral standards.
中文摘要
利用欧元区单一监管机制（SSM）建立所产生的外生变异，我们发现，相对于从受国家监管的银行借款的企业，从受超国家监管的银行借款的企业会减少其无形资产份额。这一效应在监管改革之前并不存在，且在非SSM司法管辖区中也不成立。投资从无形资产中重新配置的现象在小型和年轻企业中更为显著，并且似乎是由贷款短期减少和抵押品标准的持续提高所驱动。