Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
外部选择与员工努力
Outside Options and Worker Effort
摘要
We study how outside options affect workers’ incentives to exert effort. We exploit quasiexperimental variation from age- and experience-based cutoffs in Austria’s unemployment insurance (UI), and proxy effort with absenteeism. Extending potential UI benefit duration increases absenteeism, with larger effects for workers facing higher unemployment risk, those employed at declining or low-wage firms, or those on flatter wage profiles. These results are consistent with a relational contracting model where effort reductions caused by higher outside options are more pronounced if the perceived relationship value is small.
中文摘要
我们研究外部选择如何影响工人付出努力的激励。我们利用奥地利失业保险中基于年龄和经验的临界点所产生的准实验变异，并以缺勤作为努力程度的代理指标。延长潜在失业保险金领取期限会增加缺勤现象，且对于面临更高失业风险、就职于衰退或低工资企业、或处于更平缓工资曲线的工人，其影响更为显著。这些结果与关系契约模型一致，在该模型中，当感知到的关系价值较小时，由更高外部选择导致的努力减少更为明显。