Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文

递减收益下的过度购买、需求抑制与单一采购

Overbuying, Demand Withholding, and Single Sourcing Under Decreasing Returns

Christophe Bernard, Sébastien Mitraille

来源
Journal of Industrial Economics · 期刊论文
本站首次发现
2026-06-24 03:16
日期信息
官方在线 2026-06-03 · 来源:RSS
主题
金融公共与政治经济学国际贸易企业与产业

摘要

Consider suppliers whose comparative advantages, which are unknown to a buyer, depend on the quantity procured. The distortions of the buyer purchase policy differs depending on the market characteristics. In a large market, either it overbuys to suppliers with steep marginal costs, who are better at producing a small volume; or it withholds the demand it addresses to suppliers with flatter marginal costs, who are better at producing a large volume. The latter policy is implemented through a concave tariff offered to the less capacity constrained suppliers. In a small market, demand withholding prevails and some suppliers can be excluded.

中文摘要

考虑那些比较优势不为买方所知、且取决于采购数量的供应商。买方采购政策的扭曲程度因市场特征而异。在大市场中,要么对边际成本陡峭、擅长小批量生产的供应商过度采购;要么对边际成本平缓、擅长大批量生产的供应商缩减需求。后一种政策通过向产能约束较小的供应商提供凹形关税来实现。在小市场中,需求缩减占主导地位,部分供应商可能被排除在外。