Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
所有权复杂性与企业价值：来自韩国财阀的证据
Ownership complexity and firm value: evidence from Korean chaebols
摘要
This study examines how ownership complexity affects firm valuations by analyzing Korean chaebols’ transition from opaque circular-shareholding to more transparent pyramidal structures between 2011 and 2018. Ownership complexity can obfuscate investors’ understanding of agency conflicts between controllers and minority investors. Simplifying ownership creates transparency about controller incentives and affects valuations through two channels: increasing earnings informativeness and enabling investors to update expectations about future fundamentals. Because these forces can oppose each other, simplification can create divergent valuation effects. We find that firms with tighter controller-minority incentive alignment gain value as investors discover better-than-expected governance, while firms with greater incentive conflict lose value as transparency reveals worse-than-expected agency problems. These effects are not driven by concurrent real changes in governance, monitoring, operations, or resource allocation. Governance reforms aimed at improving transparency can thus produce heterogeneous valuation outcomes, depending on what that transparency reveals.
中文摘要
本研究考察了所有权复杂性如何影响公司估值，通过分析韩国财阀在2011年至2018年间从不透明的循环持股结构向更透明的金字塔结构的转变。所有权复杂性可能模糊投资者对控制人与少数股东之间代理冲突的理解。简化所有权结构能够提高控制人激励的透明度，并通过两条渠道影响估值：提高盈余信息含量，以及使投资者能够更新对未来基本面的预期。由于这两种力量可能相互对立，简化所有权结构可能产生分化的估值效应。我们发现，控制人与少数股东激励一致性较强的公司，随着投资者发现优于预期的治理状况而获得价值提升；而激励冲突较大的公司，则随着透明度揭示出比预期更严重的代理问题而损失价值。这些效应并非由治理、监督、运营或资源配置方面同时发生的实际变化所驱动。因此，旨在提高透明度的治理改革可能产生异质性的估值结果，具体取决于透明度所揭示的内容。