Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
竞争标准间的专利池形成
Patent pool formation between rival standards
摘要
This paper extends the Cournot–Shapiro model to provide a tractable model of voluntary patent pool formation among standard essential patent holders. We assume that patent holders have complementary patents for a standard. We first show that the existence of a path of voluntary patent pool formation heavily depends on demand for patent licenses and that no such path exists in linear demand examples. Next, we extend our model to consist of two rival standards that are substitutable and compete à la Bertrand competition. We show that while a large patent pool benefits both patent holders and licensees, it is not provided voluntarily. Our analysis suggests that the presence of a rival standard may facilitate voluntary patent pool formation.
中文摘要
本文扩展了古诺-夏皮罗模型，构建了一个可处理的标准必要专利持有人自愿组建专利池模型。我们假设专利持有人拥有互补性标准专利。首先证明，自愿组建专利池路径的存在性高度依赖于专利许可需求，在线性需求示例中不存在此类路径。其次，将模型扩展至包含两个可替代且进行伯川德竞争的标准。研究表明，尽管大型专利池对专利持有人和被许可方均有利，但该专利池无法通过自愿方式形成。我们的分析表明，竞争性标准的存在可能促进自愿专利池的组建。