Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
专利、反垄断与创新：来自施乐案的证据
Patents, Antitrust, and Innovation: Evidence From the Xerox Case
摘要
How does antitrust enforcement affect innovation when patents are the main barrier to entry? I address this question by empirically studying the US antitrust case against Xerox, the former monopolist in the market for plain-paper copiers. In 1975, Xerox accepted a consent decree whose primary remedy was compulsory licensing of all its copier-technology patents in the US and abroad. I show that this antitrust intervention promoted innovation by other firms in the copier industry, measured by a disproportionate increase in patenting in technology classes with a higher propensity for containing copier-related inventions. This effect is driven by Japanese competitors, whose patenting became more novel and diverse as they started developing smaller desktop copiers.
中文摘要
当专利构成主要进入壁垒时，反垄断执法如何影响创新？我通过实证研究美国针对施乐公司（前普通纸复印机市场垄断者）的反垄断案件来回答这一问题。1975年，施乐接受了同意令，其主要救济措施是强制许可其在美国及国外的所有复印机技术专利。我证明，这一反垄断干预促进了其他企业在复印机行业的创新，表现为在更可能包含复印机相关发明的技术类别中，专利数量不成比例地增加。这一效应由日本竞争者驱动，随着他们开始开发更小的台式复印机，其专利变得更加新颖和多样化。