Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
同伴学习、执行与声誉
Peer Learning, Enforcement, and Reputation
摘要
We study a two‐period learning model where a sequentially rational regulator builds a reputation for strict enforcement and self‐interested firms test the regulator's enforcement propensity through their misconduct. In the transparent setting, where misconduct and enforcement are observable between the firms, the regulator's reputation concern endogenously creates positive or negative enforcement externalities between the firms. When the reputation concern is strong, the enforcement externalities are negative and dominate the information externalities, encouraging misconduct. Otherwise, both externalities are positive and deter misconduct. Although a strong reputation always benefits the regulator in the opaque setting, it often backfires in a transparent setting.
中文摘要
我们研究了一个两期学习模型，其中具有序贯理性特征的监管者致力于建立严格执法的声誉，而自利的企业则通过其不当行为来试探监管者的执法倾向。在透明环境下（企业间可观察到不当行为与执法行为），监管者的声誉关切会内生地在企业间产生正向或负向的执法外部性。当声誉关切较强时，执法外部性为负向且主导信息外部性，从而助长不当行为；反之，两种外部性均为正向，能够抑制不当行为。尽管在非透明环境下，强大的声誉始终有利于监管者，但在透明环境下，这种声誉往往会产生适得其反的效果。