Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
平台陷阱
Platform Traps
摘要
A novel feature of platforms such as marketplaces and social networks is that nonparticipants may become worse off as others join. We show that in such settings, rational agents can be induced to join a platform despite being better off without it—a phenomenon we call a platform trap. We provide a theory of how platform traps emerge through one or more of the following additional features: (i) the ability of the platform to make dynamic price adjustments; (ii) the interplay between on-platform and off-platform negative externalities; (iii) favorable equilibrium selection in settings where participation decisions admit multiple equilibria.
中文摘要
平台（如市场和社会网络）的一个新颖特征是，非参与者可能因他人加入而境况恶化。我们证明，在此类情境下，理性个体即便在无平台时境况更佳，也可能被诱导加入平台——我们将此现象称为“平台陷阱”。我们提供了一种理论，阐述平台陷阱如何通过以下一个或多个附加特征形成：（i）平台进行动态价格调整的能力；（ii）平台内外负外部性的相互作用；（iii）在参与决策允许多重均衡的情境中，有利的均衡选择。