Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
政治关联、融资约束与企业税收
Political Connections, Financial Constraints, and Corporate Taxation
摘要
We find that the effect of political connections on tax planning depends on firms’ financial conditions. After increased political connections, financially unconstrained firms increase tax planning and spending on tax services, as documented in prior studies, whereas constrained firms decrease tax planning and spending on tax services. Moreover, decreases in tax planning are only present for constrained firms that obtain new bank loans and public debt and when the connected politicians serve on banking-related committees. Our results suggest that by facilitating access to external financing, political connections reduce financially constrained firms’ use of tax planning as an internal financing tool.
中文摘要
我们发现，政治关联对企业税收筹划的影响取决于企业的财务状况。在政治关联增强后，融资不受约束的企业会增加税收筹划和税务服务支出，这与先前研究的记录一致，而融资受约束的企业则减少税收筹划和税务服务支出。此外，税收筹划的减少仅出现在获得新银行贷款和公共债务的融资受约束企业中，并且当有关联的政治人物在银行相关委员会任职时也是如此。我们的结果表明，通过促进外部融资的可获得性，政治关联减少了融资受约束企业将税收筹划作为内部融资工具的运用。