Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
政治庇护、寻租与社会成本：来自中国环境治理的证据
Political Patronage, Rent-Extraction, and Social Costs: Evidence from China’s Environmental Cleanup
摘要
This paper investigates how informal political patronage subverts environmental regulation and local economic performance in China. We demonstrate that patronage provides local officials with political insurance, enabling them to safely shield polluting firms from top-down enforcement. Contrary to the promotion tournament hypothesis, this forbearance does not drive GDP growth. Instead, it is sustained through localized rent extraction. Utilizing firm-level data and shocks induced by provincial party secretary turnover, we find that connected officials extract a political tax, measured via perk expenditures, from both polluting and non-polluting enterprises. This systemic extortion generates broad negative spillovers: while shielding incumbent polluters, patronage crowds out productive investment and deters clean market entrants, ultimately degrading both environmental outcomes and the regional business environment.
中文摘要
本文探讨了非正式政治庇护如何在中国颠覆环境规制及地方经济表现。我们证明，庇护为地方官员提供了政治保险，使其能够安全地庇护污染企业免受自上而下的执法。与晋升锦标赛假说相反，这种纵容并未推动GDP增长。相反，它通过地方化的租金抽取得以维持。利用企业层面数据及省委书记更替引发的冲击，我们发现，关联官员通过额外津贴支出衡量的政治税收，从污染与非污染企业中抽取。这种系统性勒索产生了广泛的负面溢出效应：在庇护现有污染者的同时，庇护行为挤出了生产性投资，阻碍了清洁市场进入者，最终同时恶化了环境成果与区域商业环境。