Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
先发进入与技术扩散：汽车影院市场
Preemptive Entry and Technology Diffusion: The Market for Drive‐In Theaters
摘要
This article studies entry preemption in new industries. We first test a key prediction of dynamic entry games: Entry preemption is most relevant in intermediate‐sized markets, where firms face highest uncertainty about future entry. Using US drive‐in theater market (1945–1957) data, we find robust evidence for this non‐monotonic relationship between market size and early entry probability. We then estimate a dynamic entry game, and quantify preemption effects through counterfactual analysis. Preemptive motives increase early entry by up to 40% in mid‐size markets, raising entry costs by 5% and reducing firms' expected value by 1%.
中文摘要
本文研究新产业中的进入抢占行为。我们首先检验动态进入博弈的一个关键预测：进入抢占在中等规模市场中最为显著，因为此时企业面临最大的未来进入不确定性。利用美国汽车影院市场（1945-1957年）的数据，我们发现了市场规模与早期进入概率之间呈非单调关系的稳健证据。随后，我们估计了一个动态进入博弈模型，并通过反事实分析量化了抢占效应。在中等规模市场中，抢占动机使早期进入率最高增加40%，导致进入成本上升5%，并使企业预期价值降低1%。