Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文

最低广告价格限制下的价格歧视

Price discrimination under minimum advertised price restriction

Danial Asmat, Jake Kramer, Chenyu Yang

来源
International Journal of Industrial Organization · 期刊论文
本站首次发现
2026-06-14 17:05
日期信息
Crossref 元数据日期 2026-05-23 · 来源:Crossref
主题
公共与政治经济学行为与组织企业与产业

摘要

A minimum advertised price (MAP) policy is a popular vertical restraint. We study retail pricing under MAP using price data of Seagate hard disk drives on US online retailers. The data suggest that MAP is not a form of minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). First, we find that retail prices are often lower than MAP. Second, retail prices of products subject to MAP have greater dispersions between retailers. Lastly, some retail prices can increase after a MAP decrease. These observations are consistent with the predictions of a search model that interprets MAP as a form of information restraint.

中文摘要

最低广告价格(MAP)政策是一种常见的纵向约束。我们利用美国在线零售商希捷硬盘驱动器的价格数据,研究MAP下的零售定价。数据显示,MAP并非最低转售价格维持(RPM)的一种形式。首先,我们发现零售价格往往低于MAP。其次,受MAP约束的产品在零售商之间的零售价格差异更大。最后,某些零售价格可能在MAP下调后上升。这些观察结果与将MAP视为一种信息约束的搜索模型的预测相符。