Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
可操纵观测值下的价格歧视
Price Discrimination With Manipulable Observables
摘要
This article studies price discrimination by a seller who uses data on observables that buyers can control (or manipulate) at a cost. If the seller's discriminatory prices are offered covertly, equilibrium market segmentation is always coarse, resulting in limited price discrimination. In contrast, if prices must be transparently posted, every buyer pays a personalized price in equilibrium, though this does not always reduce buyer or social welfare. The analysis sheds new light on calls for transparency in how sellers utilize consumer data to customize prices and highlights potential issues with assessing welfare using (only) observed prices, pricing conduct, and market coverage.
中文摘要
本文研究卖方利用买方可以控制（或操纵）的可观测数据进行价格歧视的行为。若卖方的歧视性定价以隐蔽方式提供，均衡市场分割始终较为粗糙，导致有限的价格歧视。相反，若价格必须透明公示，则均衡状态下每位买方均需支付个性化价格，但这并不总能降低买方福利或社会福利。该分析为要求卖方透明化利用消费者数据定制价格的呼声提供了新视角，并揭示了仅依据观测价格、定价行为及市场覆盖率评估福利时可能存在的问题。