Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
算法定价
Pricing with Algorithms
摘要
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor’s price to own price. Once set, the algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly and sellers can periodically revise their algorithms. The main results are that (i) for the simple two-price model with standard profit functions, monopoly pricing is the unique equilibrium outcome, and (ii) for any general finite price grid, all equilibrium outcomes feature supra-competitive pricing. Sustenance of such collusion seems outside the scope of current antitrust laws for it does not involve any direct communication.
中文摘要
本文研究了一个重复双寡头模型中的马尔可夫完美均衡，其中卖方选择算法。算法是从竞争对手价格到自身价格的映射。一旦设定，算法会快速响应。顾客随机到达，卖方可以定期修改其算法。主要结论是：（i）对于具有标准利润函数的简单两价格模型，垄断定价是唯一的均衡结果；（ii）对于任何一般有限价格网格，所有均衡结果均呈现超竞争定价。这种合谋的维持似乎超出了现行反垄断法的适用范围，因为它不涉及任何直接沟通。