Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
动态竞赛中的奖项与反馈
Prizes and Feedback in Dynamic Contests
摘要
We study contests in which players privately choose when to exert costly effort toward a random success. A designer who values total effort and at least one success chooses how to allocate a fixed prize and what feedback to provide. The optimal design is a “weighted egalitarian” contest, which resembles a raffle. The designer withholds feedback during an early phase, then reveals successes immediately thereafter. Players work continuously during the early phase, then continue only until success during the late one. Those succeeding early receive more raffle tickets, and hence a higher probability of winning, than those succeeding later.
中文摘要
我们研究这样一种竞赛：参赛者私下选择何时为随机成功付出高昂努力。一位重视总努力和至少一次成功的设计者，决定如何分配固定奖品以及提供何种反馈。最优设计是一种“加权平均主义”竞赛，类似于抽奖。设计者在早期阶段不提供反馈，随后立即公布成功情况。参赛者在早期阶段持续努力，然后在后期阶段仅努力到成功为止。较早成功者比较晚成功者获得更多抽奖券，因而获胜概率更高。