Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
公共信息与分裂多数下的协调
Public information and coordination with a divided majority
摘要
Groups often agree that change is needed, but differing preferences and information may still lead to difficulty coordinating on a particular alternative. In a laboratory experiment, we study coordination and information aggregation in a divided-majority voting game with public information and conflicting preferences. Voters observe private signals and a public signal about whether alternative upper A $A$ A or upper B $B$ B is socially optimal. Unless sufficiently many voters agree, an inferior default upper C $C$ C occurs. When the public signal is more accurate than the private signal and voters have common preferences, most voters coordinate on the public signal. However, when public-signal accuracy is reduced or preferences conflict, voters follow the public signal less frequently. While reduced public-signal accuracy substantially increases the frequency of coordination failure, conflicting preferences between subgroups do not. These results highlight the importance of accurate public information in achieving collective action.
中文摘要
群体通常认同变革的必要性，但不同的偏好和信息仍可能导致难以就某一特定替代方案达成协调。通过一项实验室实验，我们研究了在存在公共信息和偏好冲突的分裂多数投票博弈中的协调与信息聚合问题。投票者观察私人信号以及关于替代方案A或B何者更优的公共信号。除非有足够多的投票者达成一致，否则将出现较差的默认方案C。当公共信号比私人信号更准确且投票者具有共同偏好时，多数投票者会依据公共信号进行协调。然而，当公共信号准确性降低或偏好存在冲突时，投票者遵循公共信号的频率会下降。尽管公共信号准确性降低会显著增加协调失败的发生频率，但子群体间的偏好冲突并不会产生同样影响。这些结果凸显了准确公共信息在实现集体行动中的重要性。