Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
公共部门薪酬与治理质量：来自印度一线官僚的证据
Public Sector Salaries and the Quality of Governance: Evidence from Frontline Bureaucrats in India
摘要
We examine the effects of increasing bureaucrat salaries, by analyzing a policy change in India that increased the salaries of a subset of frontline bureaucrats by 91 percent. Using a difference-indifferences design, we show that higher salaries (i) had no impact on performance, (ii) did not affect corrupt or dishonest behavior, (iii) reduced quit rates by 2.4 percentage points (16 percent) after 2 years, but did not affect the average quality of bureaucrats remaining in service. Higher salaries marginally increased effort among bureaucrats who were unhappy about their pay. Expert forecasters incorrectly predicted that higher salaries would improve bureaucrat performance and selection.
中文摘要
我们通过分析印度一项政策变革，该变革将部分一线官僚的薪资提高了91%，来考察增加官僚薪酬的影响。采用双重差分设计，我们发现更高的薪资（一）对绩效没有影响，（二）并未影响腐败或不诚实行为，（三）在两年后将离职率降低了2.4个百分点（16%），但并未影响留任官僚的平均素质。更高的薪资略微增加了那些对薪酬不满的官僚的努力程度。专家预测者错误地预期更高的薪资会改善官僚的绩效和选拔。