Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
质量与不完全竞争
Quality and Imperfect Competition
摘要
We study quality distortions when firms hold market power. We develop a model allowing for flexible functional forms of demand in order to extend Spence’s (1975) monopoly analysis to imperfect competition. We show that quality distortions are determined by a competition effect that captures the externality a firm exerts on its competitors when raising both its price and its quality, in addition to Spence’s (1975) effect related to the shape of total market demand. Our approach also allows us to analyze the effects of commodity taxation and technology shocks on the equilibrium allocation when firms compete in prices and qualities. (JEL D43, D62, H22, L13, L15, O31)
中文摘要
本文研究企业在拥有市场势力时的质量扭曲问题。我们构建了一个允许需求函数具有灵活形式的模型，将斯彭斯（1975）的垄断分析拓展至不完全竞争市场。研究表明，质量扭曲由竞争效应决定——该效应捕捉了企业在同时提高价格与质量时对竞争对手产生的外部性，此外还包含斯彭斯（1975）提出的与总市场需求形态相关的效应。我们的方法还允许分析当企业在价格与质量维度展开竞争时，商品税与技术冲击对均衡配置的影响。（JEL分类号：D43, D62, H22, L13, L15, O31）