Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
受监管职业中的质量与选择
Quality and selection in regulated professions
摘要
Abstract Entry into many occupations is regulated to screen out the least able candidates, but available evidence suggests that this objective is rarely achieved. Using microdata covering the universe of Italian law school graduates (2007-2013), we show that this result is largely due to the strong intergenerational transmission of occupations within regulated professions. We find that having relatives already active as lawyers significantly increases the probability of passing the entry exam and boosts earnings, particularly for those who performed poorly in law school.
中文摘要
许多职业的准入受到监管，旨在筛选出能力最弱的候选人，但现有证据表明这一目标很少实现。利用覆盖意大利法学院毕业生总体（2007-2013年）的微观数据，我们表明这一结果在很大程度上归因于受监管职业内部强烈的代际职业传承。我们发现，已有亲属从事律师职业显著提高了通过入职考试的概率，并提升了收入，尤其是对法学院表现不佳者而言。