Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
评级设计与进入壁垒
Ratings design and barriers to entry
摘要
I study the impact of consumer reviews on the incentives for firms to participate in the market. I develop a model of endogenous entry in which firms produce goods of heterogeneous, unknown quality. Consumers engage in directed search, and prices are exogenously fixed. A rater uses consumer reviews to construct firm‐specific ratings that are informative of quality and help consumers direct their search. The main insight of the paper is that suppressing the reviews of highly‐rated firms strengthens entry incentives and improves consumer welfare.
中文摘要
本文研究了消费者评价对企业参与市场激励的影响。我构建了一个内生进入模型，其中企业生产异质性且质量未知的商品。消费者进行定向搜索，价格外生给定。评级机构利用消费者评价构建企业特定评级，该评级能反映质量信息并帮助消费者引导搜索。本文的核心发现是：抑制高评级企业的评价会增强企业进入市场的激励，并提升消费者福利。