Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
复制研究：不同禀赋来源下的独裁者博弈
Replication: Dictator Games with different endowment sources
摘要
In Dictator Games, we manipulate whether the endowment is randomly assigned or earned by the dictator or the recipient, in a conceptual replication of Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) and Cherry et al. (2002). Our experimental sample comes from Bogota (Colombia). The experiments introduced performance thresholds based on Cherry et al. (2002), creating low-and high-stakes conditions. Our results confirm that the endowment’s origin shapes allocation decisions, but the size of the effect appears to be different between our study and the original ones conducted in North America.
中文摘要
在独裁者博弈中，我们操纵禀赋是由独裁者还是接受者随机分配或通过努力赚取，这是对Oxoby和Spraggon（2008）以及Cherry等（2002）的概念性复制。我们的实验样本来自哥伦比亚波哥大。实验引入了基于Cherry等（2002）的绩效阈值，创设了低风险和高风险条件。我们的结果证实，禀赋的来源塑造了分配决策，但效应大小在我们的研究与北美进行的原始研究之间似乎存在差异。