Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
基于批准的多人获胜投票规则的稳健性
Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules
摘要
We investigate how robust approval-based multiwinner voting rules are to small perturbations in the votes. In particular, we consider the extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the computational complexity of deciding how many such operations are necessary to change the set of winning committees. We also consider the counting variants of our problems, which can be interpreted as computing the probability that the result of an election changes after a given number of random perturbations of the given election.
中文摘要
我们探讨了基于批准的多人胜选投票规则对选票微小扰动的稳健性。具体而言，我们考虑在添加、移除或交换一个批准后，委员会可能变化的程度，并研究决定需要多少次此类操作才能改变获胜委员会集合的计算复杂性。我们还考虑了问题的计数变体，这可以解释为计算在给定选举经过一定数量的随机扰动后，选举结果发生变化的概率。