Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
上游竞争与非契约努力下的转售价格维持与纵向整合
RPM and Vertical Integration With Upstream Competition and Noncontractible Efforts
摘要
We study RPM and vertical integration in a common agency setting with two differentiated manufacturers and one retailer, where consumer demand depends on both the manufacturers' and retailer's noncontractible efforts. Under vertical separation, the adoption of maximum RPM by both manufacturers is an equilibrium and intensifies competition, since manufacturing margins are positive to incentivize manufacturing effort. This benefits consumers and may lower industry profits relative to a scenario where RPM is not available. Vertical integration between the retailer and one of the manufacturers increases industry profits and, when retail effort is also important, may benefit consumers by mitigating double marginalization.
中文摘要
我们研究了一个包含两家差异化制造商和一家零售商的共同代理框架下的转售价格维持（RPM）与纵向一体化问题，其中消费者需求同时取决于制造商和零售商不可契约化的努力水平。在纵向分离情形下，两家制造商均采用最高转售价格维持构成均衡状态，并加剧了市场竞争——这是因为制造商需维持正利润空间以激励其努力投入。相较于无法实施RPM的情形，这种机制使消费者获益，但可能降低行业整体利润。当零售商与其中一家制造商实现纵向一体化时，行业利润得以提升；若零售努力同样重要，该模式还能通过缓解双重边际化效应使消费者受益。