Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文

安全投票:对弃权与女巫攻击的鲁棒性

Safe voting: resilience to abstention and sybils

Reshef Meir, Gal Shahaf, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon

来源
Review of Economic Design · 期刊论文
本站首次发现
2026-07-27 22:47
日期信息
官方在线 2025-12-12 · 来源:RSS
主题
国际贸易理论与博弈

摘要

Voting rules may implement the will of society when all eligible voters vote, and only them. However, they may fail to do so when sybil (fake or duplicate) votes are present and when only some honest (non-sybil) voters actively participate. As this is often the case, our aim here is to address social choice in the presence of sybils and voter abstention. To do so, we build upon the framework of Reality-aware Social Choice: we assume the status quo as an ever-present distinguished alternative, and study status quo Enforcing (SQE) voting rules , which add virtual votes in support of the status quo. We characterize the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of active honest voters to maintain/change the status quo, respectively) in several domains, and show that the voting rules are often optimal. Our characterization identifies the exact conditions under which mechanisms remain both resilient to sybils and responsive to verified participation, offering a quantitative tool for designers to measure the benefit of increased participation and verified identities. We comment on the applicability of our methods and analyses to the governance of digital communities.

中文摘要

投票规则在全体合格选民参与投票时,能够实现社会意愿,且仅在此情况下成立。然而,当存在虚假(伪造或重复)投票,且仅有部分诚实(非虚假)选民积极参与时,这些规则可能失效。鉴于这种情况普遍存在,本文旨在解决存在虚假投票和选民弃权时的社会选择问题。为此,我们基于"现实感知社会选择"框架展开研究:将现状视为始终存在的特殊备选项,并研究"现状强制执行"投票规则——该规则通过增加支持现状的虚拟投票来实现。我们在多个领域刻画了安全性与活跃性(分别指活跃诚实选民维持/改变现状的能力)之间的权衡关系,并证明这些投票规则通常具有最优性。我们的刻画揭示了机制在保持对虚假投票的韧性同时,又能对已验证参与做出响应的确切条件,为设计者提供了衡量参与度提升与身份验证效益的量化工具。最后,我们讨论了研究方法与分析结果在数字社区治理中的适用性。本文为订阅内容预览,需通过机构登录以获取访问权限。