Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
搜索、急性疾病与缺勤
Search, Acute Illness, and Absenteeism
摘要
This paper examines the economic costs of absenteeism from acute illness, which reduces labor market participation and burdens workers and firms. I extend a search, matching, and bargaining framework to incorporate medical care use, illness dynamics, health capital, and employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), I estimate the model and find that acute illness lowers productivity, raises medical expenditures, and reduces welfare. Counterfactual analyses show subsidizing health capital improves total welfare. Moreover, while both a universal ESHI mandate and a penaltybased policy expand coverage, the penalty-based approach yields greater welfare gains.
中文摘要
本文考察了急性疾病导致的缺勤所带来的经济成本，这种缺勤降低了劳动力市场参与度，并给工人和企业带来负担。我将搜索、匹配与谈判框架扩展至涵盖医疗服务使用、疾病动态、健康资本及雇主提供的健康保险（ESHI）。利用医疗支出小组调查（MEPS）的数据，我估计了该模型，并发现急性疾病降低了生产率、增加了医疗支出并减少了福利。反事实分析表明，补贴健康资本能提升总体福利。此外，尽管强制性的ESHI规定和基于惩罚的政策均能扩大保险覆盖范围，但基于惩罚的方法能带来更大的福利增益。