Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
选择性信息共享与群体错觉
Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion
摘要
Although groups usually manage to combine information to make well-informed decisions, they also make mistakes. We investigate experimentally one source of suboptimal decision-making by groups: the selective and asymmetric sharing of egorelevant information within teams. We show that positive performance feedback is shared more often with team members than negative performance feedback. Asymmetric information sharing combined with the receivers’ selection neglect boosts team confidence compared to an unbiased exchange of feedback. Consequently, weaker teams make worse investment decisions in bets whose success depends on the team’s ability. The endogenous social exchange of ego-relevant information may foster detrimental group delusion.
中文摘要
尽管群体通常能够整合信息以做出明智决策，但他们也会犯错。我们通过实验研究群体决策次优的一个来源：团队内与自我相关的信息的选择性和不对称分享。我们表明，正面绩效反馈比负面绩效反馈更常被分享给团队成员。不对称的信息分享，加上接收者的选择忽视，相比无偏见的反馈交流，增强了团队的信心。因此，较弱的团队在赌注中做出更差的投资决策，这些赌注的成功取决于团队的能力。自我相关信息的内生社会交流可能助长有害的群体错觉。