Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
自我执行的岗位匹配
Self-Enforced Job Matching
摘要
Complementarities and peer effects are common in matching markets, yet incorporating them often leads to nonexistence of stable matchings. We observe that matching is often an ongoing process rather than a static allocation, where long-lived firms interact over time with short-lived workers. We show that when wages are flexible and firms are sufficiently patient, a dynamically stable solution always exists in many-to-one matching markets — even with complementarities and peer effects. Flexible wages are crucial to our result, as they not only facilitate surplus extraction when firms cooperate in no-poaching agreements but also enhance the threat of punishment through bidding wars. (JEL C72, C73, C78, D21, D62, J31, J41)
中文摘要
互补性与同伴效应在匹配市场中普遍存在，但将其纳入模型往往导致稳定匹配的缺失。我们观察到，匹配通常是一个持续的过程而非静态配置——长期存续的企业与短期工作的劳动者会随时间推移持续互动。研究表明，在工资具有灵活性且企业具备充分耐心的条件下，多对一匹配市场中始终存在动态稳定解——即便存在互补性与同伴效应。灵活工资机制对结论至关重要：它不仅在企业达成互不挖角协议时促进剩余提取，更能通过竞价战强化惩罚威胁。（JEL分类号：C72, C73, C78, D21, D62, J31, J41）