Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
单调多发送者信号博弈中的简单前向归纳
Simple forward induction in monotonic multi-sender signaling games
摘要
We introduce a new, powerful, and easy-to-use solution concept called simple forward induction which is implied by strategic stability in generic finite multi-sender signaling games. We apply this concept to infinite monotonic signaling games and show that a unique simple forward induction outcome exists and is non-distorted by asymmetric information. We also show that, in this class of games, the non-distorted outcome is the limit of stable outcomes of finite games. Hence, in this sense, we characterize stable outcomes in this class of games. The definition of our solution concept can be easily extended to arbitrary extensive-form games.
中文摘要
我们提出了一种新颖、强大且易于使用的解概念，称为简单前向归纳法，该概念在一般有限多发送者信号博弈中由策略稳定性所蕴含。我们将这一概念应用于无限单调信号博弈，并证明存在唯一的简单前向归纳结果，且该结果不受信息不对称的扭曲。我们还证明，在此类博弈中，非扭曲结果是有限博弈稳定结果的极限。因此，在此意义上，我们刻画了此类博弈中的稳定结果。我们的解概念定义可轻松推广至任意扩展式博弈。