Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
不对称信息与外部性下的同时与序贯竞争
Simultaneous and Sequential Competition With Asymmetric Information and Externalities
摘要
This paper examines the joint role of strategic timing, asymmetric private demand and cost information, and common ownership in shaping equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. We develop a three‐firm model and study Cournot and Stackelberg competition. The main results are as follows. (1) Mover advantages are determined by relative signal precision: the leader benefits most when the second mover has a more precise signal, the second mover benefits most when the last mover has high signal precision, and the last mover benefits when both followers have sufficiently noisy signals. (2) Cournot competition generates greater consumer and total surplus and lower total profits than Stackelberg competition if neither follower has significantly higher signal precision than the leader. (3) Common ownership increases consumer and total surplus but reduces total profits in Stackelberg competition if and only if the last mover is not substantially better informed than the leader. These findings have implications for contests, partnership, network, public good, common resource, and gas emission games with altruistic preferences. Since total profit in oligopoly models can be interpreted as aggregate welfare in these environments, the welfare rankings are reversed.
中文摘要
摘要 本文研究了战略时机、非对称私有需求与成本信息以及共同所有权在寡头垄断市场均衡结果中的联合作用。我们构建了一个三企业模型，并分析了古诺竞争与斯塔克伯格竞争。主要结论如下：（1）先动优势取决于相对信号精度：当后动者拥有更精确的信号时，先动者获益最大；当最后动者信号精度较高时，第二动者获益最大；当两个追随者的信号均足够模糊时，最后动者获益最大。（2）若任一追随者的信号精度未显著高于先动者，古诺竞争比斯塔克伯格竞争能带来更高的消费者剩余与总剩余，但总利润更低。（3）在斯塔克伯格竞争中，当且仅当最后动者的信息优势未显著超过先动者时，共同所有权会提升消费者剩余与总剩余，但降低总利润。这些发现对存在利他偏好的竞赛、合伙、网络、公共品、公共资源及气体排放博弈具有启示意义。由于寡头模型中的总利润可被解释为这些环境中的总福利，福利排序将发生逆转。