Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
空间企业分类与地方买方垄断势力
Spatial Firm Sorting and Local Monopsony Power
摘要
Using German administrative data, we document that high-wage locations have lower labor shares and higher wage dispersion. We show that a parsimonious model, in which firm monopsony power stems from search frictions, can explain these facts if "superstar" firms sort into productive locations. This positive sorting, which emerges under sufficiently strong firm–location complementarity or large frictions, steepens local wage ladders and raises wages and wage inequality. Moreover, sorting reduces labor shares because more productive firms have more monopsony power. Our estimates indicate that firm sorting rationalizes lower local labor shares in high-wage locations and 40% of their increased wage dispersion.
中文摘要
利用德国行政数据，我们记录了高工资地区具有较低的劳动份额和较高的工资离散度。我们表明，一个简约模型——其中企业买方垄断力量源于搜寻摩擦——若“超级明星”企业分类排序进入高生产率地区，则能够解释这些事实。这种正向分类排序在足够强的企业—区位互补性或较大摩擦下出现，会加剧本地工资阶梯的陡峭程度，并提高工资和工资不平等。此外，分类排序降低了劳动份额，因为生产率更高的企业拥有更强的买方垄断力量。我们的估计表明，企业分类排序能够解释高工资地区较低的本地劳动份额及其工资离散度上升的40%。