Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
存储博弈
Storage games
摘要
We study a long-horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity—that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities by tacitly colluding. This cooperation takes new forms thanks to the multiplicity of actions they must take: selling, buying, or both. We construct payoff-maximizing equilibria of this stochastic game, and uncover a new form of Partial Cooperation that trades off quantities and delay. While collusive, Partial Cooperation delivers higher consumer surplus thanks to the market power effect. Head-on competition is not always an equilibrium of the long-horizon game when market power becomes large enough. We draw implications for policy and suggest poorly competitive storage is a negative externality to the development of the underlying commodity—for example, renewable energy.
中文摘要
我们研究了一个长期视野下的寡头垄断市场，其中需求受到随机冲击，而两家具有有限容量的存储运营商可以通过套利来应对这些冲击。此问题适用于任何可储存商品——即大多数商品。由于套利价差对市场力量极为敏感，存储运营商面临通过默契合谋来限制数量的强烈激励。鉴于他们必须采取多种行动——出售、购买或两者兼有，这种合作呈现出新的形式。我们构建了该随机博弈中的利润最大化均衡，并揭示了一种新的部分合作形式，它在数量与延迟之间进行权衡。尽管属于合谋性质，部分合作因市场力量效应而带来了更高的消费者剩余。当市场力量足够大时，正面竞争并不总是长期博弈中的均衡状态。我们为政策制定提供了启示，并指出存储领域竞争不足对基础商品——例如可再生能源——的发展构成了一种负外部性。