Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
战略性企业社会责任与并购决策
Strategic corporate social responsibility and merger decisions
摘要
This paper investigates the conditions under which mergers between corporate social responsibility (CSR) firms are both privately profitable and socially desirable. We develop a Cournot model of quantity competition with product differentiation, featuring both CSR and non-CSR firms. CSR firms engage in observable CSR investment, which affects consumer willingness to pay depending on the level of CSR cognition in the market. We analyse a two-stage game in which CSR firms decide whether to propose a merger and a (myopic) Antitrust Authority (AA) determines whether to authorise it. Our results show that the profitability and approval of such mergers crucially depend on the degree of product differentiation and consumer sensitivity to CSR. When products are sufficiently complementary (or weakly substitutable) and CSR awareness is high, the merger increases both firm profits and consumer surplus, leading to regulatory approval. However, when the merger induces the exit of non-CSR competitors and products are homogeneous, a divergence emerges between private and social incentives, with the AA often blocking otherwise profitable mergers. These findings provide novel insights into merger policy design in settings where ethical competition and market power coexist.
中文摘要
本文探讨了企业社会责任（CSR）企业之间的合并既具有私人盈利性又具有社会合意性的条件。我们构建了一个包含产品差异化的数量竞争古诺模型，其中同时包含CSR企业与非CSR企业。CSR企业进行可观察的CSR投资，该投资根据市场中CSR认知水平影响消费者的支付意愿。我们分析了一个两阶段博弈，其中CSR企业决定是否提议合并，而（短视的）反垄断机构（AA）决定是否批准该合并。我们的结果表明，此类合并的盈利性与批准与否关键取决于产品差异化程度和消费者对CSR的敏感度。当产品充分互补（或弱替代）且CSR意识较高时，合并既增加企业利润又提升消费者剩余，从而获得监管批准。然而，当合并导致非CSR竞争对手退出且产品同质时，私人激励与社会激励之间出现分歧，反垄断机构往往阻止原本有利可图的合并。这些发现为在伦理竞争与市场力量并存的背景下设计合并政策提供了新颖见解。