Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
网络中的策略性证据披露与均衡歧视
Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination
摘要
A group of agents with ex ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbors), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbors (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent’s ex ante winning probability is monotone in degree. All equilibria that satisfy some robustness criteria lie between this adversarial disclosure equilibrium and a less informative one that features no snitching and no discrimination. (JEL D82, D83, D85, Z13)
中文摘要
一群事前独立且同分布质量不确定的代理人竞争由委托人授予的奖项。代理人可能掌握其社交关系对象（邻居）及自身质量的证据。在某一均衡中，证据的对抗性披露导致委托人根据代理人拥有的邻居数量（度数）进行统计性歧视。我们识别出使代理人事前获胜概率随度数单调变化的参数区间。所有满足某些稳健性标准的均衡均介于该对抗性披露均衡与一个信息量更少（无告密且无歧视）的均衡之间。（JEL D82, D83, D85, Z13）