Econ Papers Daily / 工作论文
开放经济中的战略货币政策
Strategic Monetary Policy in Open Economies
摘要
We examine optimal non-cooperative monetary policy in a two-country New Keynesian setting with complete financial markets and pricing to market for goods. In contrast to the case in which the law of one price holds for goods, currency misalignments are an important consideration even for self-oriented policymakers. Financial markets are critical in the analysis. Under “full” commitment, the optimal policy considers the effects on asset values and hence wealth distribution across countries. Optimal policy under full commitment differs from the “partial” commitment case in which the policy commitment is not made until after asset markets clear. Surprisingly, the optimal targeting rule under strategic policy with full commitment is the same as under cooperative policy. In this setting, changes in state-contingent claim prices offset the wealth a self-oriented policymaker might seek through terms-of-trade manipulation, and we show that there are no gains from cooperation. Although a policy chosen under partial commitment may be desirable from a country’s perspective, the resulting Nash equilibrium yields lower welfare.
中文摘要
我们在一个具有完全金融市场和商品按市场定价的两国新凯恩斯主义框架中考察最优非合作货币政策。与商品一价定律成立的情形相比，即使对自利型政策制定者而言，货币错配也是一个重要考虑因素。金融市场在分析中至关重要。在“完全”承诺下，最优政策考虑对资产价值的影响，从而考虑跨国财富分配的影响。完全承诺下的最优政策不同于“部分”承诺情形，后者直到资产市场出清后才做出政策承诺。令人惊讶的是，完全承诺下战略政策的最优目标规则与合作政策下相同。在这种设定下，状态依存索取权价格的变化抵消了自利型政策制定者可能通过贸易条件操纵寻求的财富，并且我们表明合作没有收益。尽管从一国角度看，部分承诺下选择的政策可能是合意的，但由此产生的纳什均衡带来较低的福利。