Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
竞争对手企业中的战略性股权收购：共同所有权与交叉所有权
Strategic Stake Acquisitions in Rival Firms: Common vs. Cross‐Ownership
摘要
We study how a blockholder who controls a firm should acquire a minority stake in a rival: directly, creating common ownership , or indirectly through the controlled firm, creating cross‐ownership . Common ownership generates stronger internalization of competitive externalities and allows the blockholder to capture the resulting gains without sharing them with dispersed shareholders. However, it may also create conflicts of interest with minority shareholders that can lead to a loss of control. Cross‐ownership avoids this governance risk but internalizes competition less effectively. We characterize how the optimal acquisition mode depends on the nature of product market competition and the strength of corporate governance.
中文摘要
我们研究控制一家公司的大股东应如何获取竞争对手的少数股权：是直接获取（形成共同所有权），还是通过所控制的公司间接获取（形成交叉所有权）。共同所有权能更有效地内化竞争外部性，并使大股东在不与分散股东分享收益的情况下获取由此产生的收益。然而，这可能会与少数股东产生利益冲突，进而导致控制权丧失。交叉所有权可规避这种治理风险，但内化竞争的效果较差。我们刻画了最优收购模式如何取决于产品市场竞争的性质以及公司治理的强度。