Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
战略交易与大宗股东动态
Strategic Trading and Blockholder Dynamics
摘要
We study strategic trading by a privately informed blockholder who monitors a company and trades its shares. Private information results in larger block sizes in good states, but by increasing the speed of the blockholder's selling, it can result in lower block sizes in bad states. Despite the heterogeneous impact on expected block size, we show that asymmetric information leads to Pareto improvements: it raises stock prices, benefits small uninformed shareholders, and benefits the block owner, despite the negative impact on liquidity.
中文摘要
我们研究了一位拥有私人信息的控股股东的战略性交易行为，该股东既监督公司又交易其股份。私人信息在良好状态下导致更大的持股规模，但通过加快控股股东的卖出速度，在不利状态下可能导致持股规模减小。尽管对预期持股规模的影响存在异质性，我们表明信息不对称带来了帕累托改进：它提高了股价，惠及小型不知情股东，并有利于控股股东，尽管对流动性产生了负面影响。